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Abstract. Trust, rather than being simply a resource for establishing collaborative relationships between organi-
zations, is an essential component of their constitution. At base, trust involves interpersonal relations of a specific
type. These are relations where there is sufficient probability that a person or organization with whom one is in
contact will perform an action that is beneficial, or at least not detrimental, for one to consider engaging in some
form of cooperation with this person or organization in the future. Trust establishes situations in which participants
in collaboration have a long-term and recurrent relationship. Where trust exists, organizations are more willing to
collaborate with other organizations on a more reciprocal basis. Trust is especially important when collaboration
takes place between competitors because the risk of opportunistic behaviour is higher. Where organizations share
resources and information openly with other participants they will seek to reduce opportunistic behaviour through
the mutual understanding and goodwill of parties. However, trust is not static; it is a dynamic process that evolves
according to the development of the relationship, as one in which the more long-term the relationship, the greater
the trust. In this paper, we will present the impact of trust on business networks and examine how their members
developed knowledge through networking.
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Introduction
Trust can be understood as “the expectation that some others in our social relationships have
moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for other’s interests
above their own” (Barber, 1983). Implicit in this definition is a temporal dimension, captured
by Thorelli (1986) when he considers trust to be a concept based on the confidence that
relationships will continue in the future. Thus, trust implies a long-term projected future
vision based on past reputation and previous performance. However, as Shaw (1997) notices,
trust is not always based on past experiences.
Many scholars, from different perspectives, have written about trust. Arrow (1974) con-
sidered trust as a basic element not only for organizations but also for the economy in general,
affirming that trust is a lubricant to economic exchange. As Granovetter (1985) argues, peo-
ple and organizations typically seek to generate trust and discourage malfeasance. Trust is
based on individual expectations of interpersonal or interorganizational relations premised
on a specific kind of probability. One presupposes that organizations—as agents—will
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perform beneficially—or at the least will not act detrimentally to the interests one repre-
sents. On this basis we would consider engaging this agent in some form of collaboration in
the future. Indeed, a synonym for trust could well be ‘confidence’—that one has confidence
in the actions of another agent.
According to Husted (1994) there are three different kinds of collaboration depending
on the degree of trust involved in each relationship: high-trust, low-trust and zero-trust, or
opportunistic, relationship. A high level of trust can be achieved in a long-term relationship
where members share norms and values and where relations involve more than one aspect of
the organization. As Newell and Swan (2000, p. 1288) suggest, this can give rise to particular
problems at the interorganizational level, “because networks are not governed by traditional
hierarchical relationship, critical problems surround the development and maintenance of
trust and the deployment of power among members.” Trust in collaboration places a heavy
emphasis on norms of reciprocity. Larson and Starr (1993) argue that interpersonal contact
and sharing of understanding of the conduct and behaviour of participants in a relationship
provides a certain minimum level of understanding, giving rise to trust and reciprocity.
Larson and Starr (1993) suggest that collaboration will be based on previous positive expe-
riences with partners; thus, collaboration between competitors without prior collaborative
experience could thus be very risky. Reciprocity encourages continuous collaboration when
it builds social capital.
The role that trust performs
Bidault and Jarillo (1997) argue that trust can be based on different sources. Contracts
establish a foundation for developing trust; ethics provides rules and values for actors to
behave in different circumstances; the role of time and experience is important because
trust increases with the number of transactions made by participants while familiarity re-
lates to participants knowing each other before a transaction. (To this list Brunsson et al.
(2000) would add standards—that where organizational action is constructed according
to some standard then we can be confident about it.) However, trust is not necessarily
reciprocal—parties base it on subjective evaluation. Thus, trust is specific for each par-
ticipant in collaboration and cannot be interchanged, as can a good or service. It is clear
that in the case of total trust between actors there is no need for contracts; thus, contracts
act to shape the way participants will behave when operating in circumstances of uncer-
tainty. The less that trust exists, the more contracts should be clear and extensive. With
respect to any specific issue the rule appears to be that, the more the trust, the less contracts
must be extensive. In such a situation, transaction costs are reduced. Bidault and Jarillo
(1997) consider trust as a coordinating mechanism that can make transactions cheaper,
in the sense that, once trust has been established, contracts will not be needed between
participants.
High levels of trust lead to informal assurances buttressing, or aiding, the interpretation
of formal contractual commitments, perhaps even replacing them. What are the qualities
that can achieve such outcomes? At the minimum, most people would probably agree that
the following qualities should be present: integrity; loyalty; competence; consistency, and
openness or transparency. Wolff (1994), drawing on the experience of various practitioners,
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suggested several strategies, beyond professional competence, for building trust. Among
these are encouraging friendship, so that individuals get to know each other over time, as
well as facilitating communication by sharing information with counterparts, keeping them
informed about plans. Also, one should limit management initiative through agreements in
order to aid self-control and identification of possible cultural organizational barriers. There
should be anticipation of disagreement by learning about the other organization, its culture
and possible areas of disagreement. One should seek to avoid others being surprised: if one
perceives something that can have an effect on ones partner, one should make them aware
of it. Trust increases collaboration between participants when they perceive the relationship
to be long-term and one in which all members will enjoy a benefit, according to their
contributions to their agreement.
Collaborative agreements presume a different form of exchange from the models of
economic rationalism: they suggest exchange based on trust and collaboration between
participants, rather than competition. However, as Gambetta (1988, p. 215) suggests, trust
is necessary for all exchange: “even to compete, in a mutually non-destructive way, one
needs at some level to trust one’s competitors to comply with certain rules”. He says, trust:
is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another
agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such
action. . . and in a context in which it affects his own action. [W]e implicitly mean that
the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental
to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him
(Gambetta, 1988, p. 217).
Trust is not static; it is a dynamic process that evolves according to the development of the
relationship. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) established a model of trust in three levels linked
in a sequence where, once trust has been established in one level, it moves to the next level.
Those levels of trust are calculus-based, knowledge-based, and identification-based. At the
calculus-based level, parties fear punishment, but also anticipate the rewards from preserving
trust; in other words, trust is based on a calculus of costs and benefits. Knowledge-based
trust develops over time in the permanent contact between participants; it is “grounded in the
other’s predictability—knowing the other sufficiently well so that the other’s behaviour is
anticipatable. Knowledge-based trust relies on information rather than deterrence” (Lewicki
and Bunker, 1996, p. 121). Identification-based trust is “based on identification with the
other’s desires and intentions” (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, p. 122). At this stage, parties
know each other and may anticipate the reactions of the other participant; thus, they can act
for the other. Ultimately, high trust implies an expectation that a relationship will continue
in the future.
Zucker (1986) argues that trust has two major components. These are background ex-
pectations, where things are ‘taken for granted’ because actors know each other in terms
of their ‘attitude’ of daily life and reciprocity of perspectives and constitutive expectations,
the rules defining the context of the situation in terms of independence from self-interest
and intersubjective meaning. She considers the existence of three central modes of social
production of trust:
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Table 1. Modes of trust production.
Basis Source Measures
1. Process Tied to exchange, past or Reputation, brands, No market; investment
expected gift-giving in trust
2. Characteristic Tied to person, ascribed Family background, No market; free trust
ethnicity, gender
3. Institutional Tied to formal social Signals Active market; purchase
structures of trust
Source: After Zucker (1986, p. 60).
(1) process-based, where trust is tied to past or expected exchange such as in reputation
or gift-exchange; (2) characteristic-based, where trust is tied to the person, depending
on characteristics such as family background or ethnicity; and (3) institutional-based,
where trust is tied to formal societal structures, depending on individual or firm-specific
attributes (e.g., certification as an accountant) or on intermediary mechanisms (e.g., use
of escrow accounts) (Zucker, 1986, p. 60).
Zucker (1986) argues that although trust is difficult to measure it can be considered as a
skill, such that each one of the modes of trust production can be measured with indicators
(Table 1).
Dodgson (1994) has pointed out the negative implications of trust-based collaboration.
Granstrand and Sjolander (1994) have noted the ways in which high levels of trust and
collaboration within professional communities, for instance, can lead to conflict between
collaborating professional groups with distinct cultural assumptions and identities. In other
words, in-group social capital can have exclusionary implications for out-groups. Differ-
ent ‘social capital’ may create inherent trust within groups it characterises but a lack of
coherence when these are collaboratively connected. Social capital comprises “the norms
and social relations embedded in the social structures of society that enable people to coor-
dinate action and to achieve desired goals” (Narayan, 1999, p. 6). Burt (1992) argues that
individuals have three types of capital: physical, human and social. Physical capital refers
to the resources such as money and land that an individual has access to. Human capital
is the personal knowledge, abilities and charisma that the individual has while working.
Social capital is the network of individual contacts that the individual knows and the people
known by the contacts.
Burt (1992) considers that social capital is closely related to success because those who
have it obtain an additional benefit from physical and human capital by benefit of increased
access, time and referrals. The benefits come from information gained through contacts.
This is a very important factor because no one in an organization has access to all existing
information. Related to access is the time to obtain the information. Burt (1992) argues that
in general, personal contacts offer better information faster. Our contacts refer us to others
and thus, in this way, give shape to our reputation. In this way, individuals with social capital
are more able to succeed in their careers.
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Putnam (1993) established the centrality of ‘social capital’ for economic success.
Coleman (1990) argues that “social capital is not a private property of any of the per-
sons that benefit from it” but a feature of the networks that bridge between them. The
concept of bridging social capital has found explicit use in recent work from the World
Bank: Bebbington et al. (2000) make an important distinction between bonding social cap-
ital (the ties within a group), and bridging social capital (the ties existing between different
groups). Social capital not only influences policy choice, policy implementation, and mar-
ket success but also people’s access to resources (Portes, 1998). Thus, in operationalizing
trust one must focus on relational rather than personal attributes, as well as the capacity for
learning to build trust. Building trust in business means that those who would be members
of some grouping founded on trust must have confidence in a number of critical areas.
Amongst these are: the overall business concept; the business synergy of the participating
companies; the members’ ability to formalise a business model as a vehicle for winning,
doing and servicing work; the business processes developed; the market opportunity; the
product/service, and the proven capacity and capability of the members. If there was no
trust, none of the participants would take the risk to move first, thus, collaboration would
not take place, and an individualistic approach would prevail over a collective, collaborative
effort.
Building collaboration in networks
Trust is a crucial element for collaboration. Where trust exists, one can propose that orga-
nizations will be more willing to collaborate with other organizations on a more reciprocal
basis. Further, organizations will tend to share resources and information more openly
with other participants; they will tend to reduce opportunistic behaviour through the mu-
tual understanding and goodwill of parties. Thus, different reasons exist for establishing
collaborative arrangements between organizations.
In the past, where firms needed access to resources that they did not have, economic
orthodoxy suggested that they were confronted with a ‘make or buy’ decision (Kogut, Shan
and Walker, 1992; Pyatt, 1995). Traditionally, the way organizations obtained knowledge or
access to resources that they did not already make was through vertical integration, either via
acquisition or through merger (Powell, 1987). Vertical integration was the most common
form of organization used to obtain secure materials for production. Vertical integration
was useful in slow markets where organizations did not need to adapt rapidly, when the
technological change was less dynamic than in present times (Jarillo, 1993; Powell, 1987).
However, when the environment is highly dynamic, organizations are forced to adopt new
strategies and more flexible structures to guarantee greater adaptability to the changing
conditions of the environment (Emery and Trist, 1965).
Child and Faulkner (1998, p. 1: see figure 1) claim “a cooperative strategy is the attempt
by organizations to realise their objectives through cooperation with other organizations”.
They argue that collaboration, as well as competition, can be more or less intense between
partners. One can appreciate from figure 1 that, in Child and Faulkner’s (1998) terms, where
both collaboration and competition are low it is most likely that the relationship will fail
to achieve its goals or, at best, obtain poor results. This is the result of poor interaction
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Figure 1. Alternative relationships between collaboration and competition.
between participants in any relationship. Where collaboration is low and competition high,
there is increasing risk that one of the parties will act opportunistically, where, for example,
a powerful member dominates the relationship. Both situations manifest a poor degree of
collaboration between participants where it is likely that the relationship will terminate
sooner rather than later.
There are two situations possible where collaboration is high. Where competition is low
and collaboration is high, the most viable option is vertical integration, when one of the
partners will integrate with the other partner through merger or acquisition. This strategy
has been widely used to order relations between organizations; however, this strategy is not
an option when organizations need to collaborate with other organizations. The best strategy
for organizations is where both collaboration and competition are high; in such a case the
major benefit is mutual learning for participants, all of which remain individual organizations
collaborating in some areas of their business activities, while remaining competitors in the
rest of their activities.
In collaborative interorganizational settings, trust increases where each project team is
self-sufficient and includes ‘outsiders’ like user-representatives (Clegg, Hardy and Nord,
1996). Trust increases also when the member organizations have had previous contact.
When teams have a social and celebratory dimension trust levels typically increase. Also,
where project participants have prior experience with relevant technology or previous co-
operative programs, it increases the probability of success in any given project. Another
element that has a positive effect on trust is the intensity and duration of the relationship.
According to Clegg, Hardy and Nord (1996), the more long-term the relationship the greater
the trust. Following Luhmann (1979), if trust exists, people can allow themselves forms of
collaboration that will help them in the rational pursuit of their interests. Thus, trust is a
precondition for collaboration, but it is also a product. Therefore, trust building is an impor-
tant element in collaboration. Participants must demonstrate their willingness to commit to
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a collaborative relationship by adapting to each of the participants. Trust is an important
variable affecting the effectiveness of any relationship.
Transaction costs
Trust is an implicit concept underlying economic analysis because it determines the effec-
tiveness of transactions. Opportunistic action reveals a lack of trust. Where trust is present
in one parties’ expectations of a collaboration, the presumption is typically that other par-
ties will display non-opportunism; the assumption is that third parties will behave honestly
during the transaction. Trust is understood as “the presumption that, in a situation of un-
certainty, the other party even in unforeseen circumstances will act in accordance with the
rules of behaviour that are deemed acceptable” (Bidault and Jarillo, 1997, p. 85). Where
trust is present, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests that it can reduce the ‘trans-
action costs’ (Williamson, 1975, 1985) associated with exchange relations. According to
Williamson (1975, 1981), the basics of TCE are that individuals look for efficiency and so
seek to economise in their transactions. For Williamson (1981, p. 552)
a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically sepa-
rable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins. With a well-working
interface, as with a well-working machine, these transfers occur smoothly. In mechanical
systems we look for frictions: do the gear mesh, are the parts lubricated, is there needless
slippage or other loss of energy? The economic counterpart of friction is transaction cost:
do parties to the exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent misunderstandings
and conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns, and other malfunctions?
The assumptions of TCE include two individual behaviours. These involve assumptions
that economic actors will characteristically display bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) and
opportunistic behaviour. What predispose actors in their bounded rationality and oppor-
tunistic behaviour are the three other basic elements of the TCE approach: asset specificity,
uncertainty, and frequency of transactions. Because of the bounded rationality of individu-
als, economic exchange is characteristically organized by contracts. Contracts serve to limit
actor rationalities and opportunism. Such contracts can be internal (employment contracts)
or external (suppliers contracts). Asset specificity refers to the assets invested or required to
complete any transaction that are particular to a specific transaction and that have no alter-
native applications (Kalleberg et al., 1995; Kalleberg and Reve, 1993). Williamson (1981,
pp. 555–556) considers that asset specificity can take various types: site specificity (identi-
fied with Thompson’s 1967 description of the ‘core technology’), physical asset specificity,
and human asset specificity.
The TCE analysis approach is generally regarded as a theoretical model of those mech-
anisms that support efficient economic transactions (Heide, 1994). A central thesis of the
transaction cost approach is that as the uncertainty of transactions increases—as a measure
of performance—there will be a shift from markets to hierarchies to manage economic rela-
tions. According to this approach, there are certain costs associated with any transaction. In
the absence of transaction costs, organizations do not need to integrate functions with other
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organizations and the market-based structure will be the most efficient form of relation-
ship. In a case where transaction costs rise sufficiently, the market option is not a suitable
solution; thus, organizations have to integrate functions through recourse to hierarchy. Ac-
cordingly, markets are based primarily on price mechanisms while hierarchies are based on
authority.
Thompson et al. (1991) argue that the paradigm underlying transaction cost is one of
competition between hierarchies and free markets in a form of ‘zero-sum’ game. The main
question for transaction cost economics is how to differentiate opportunistic from non-
opportunistic behaviours. If there is no trust between parties involved in a relationship, then
contracts have to emerge. If trust exists in the relationship, then there is no need for contracts.
Thus, one vital assumption of TCE concerns human nature, which is characterized as
being both individualistic and opportunistic. In deciding not to act individually, individuals
assume that they have no choice; untrustworthy individuals, in a world comprised of other
untrustworthy individuals, must expect that their partners will behave opportunistically
(Williamson, 1975).
Williamson (1975, 1985) differentiates ‘hierarchies’ from ‘markets’, identifying hier-
archies (or organizations) as an alternative form for exchange or transaction, from the
market, the preferred analytical object of the economics discipline. Hierarchies are a form
of organization where firms tend to integrate vertically as a way to access resources. Ac-
cordingly, the market governance structure is based on prices while hierarchies are based
on authority. According to Williamson (1991), ‘efficiency’ is the criterion that determines
the desirability of outcomes as either market or hierarchy. Normally, markets are efficient
and organizations are not; moreover, when markets fail organizations may prosper but, over
time, “[o]rganisational failure would return to markets what market failure gave to orga-
nizations” (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996, p. 15). According to TCE, markets will fail as an
organizing device, under certain conditions, including bounded rationality, opportunism,
uncertainty/complexity, and small numbers. TCE has been criticized on a number of counts
for embodying a hidden ideology that distorts more than it illuminates (Perrow, 1981); for
being ad-hoc theorising divorced from reality (Simon, 1991); for lacking generality, because
of an ethnocentric bias (Dore, 1983), as well as for ignoring the contextual grounding of
human actions and, therefore, presenting an under-socialized view of human motivation
and an over-socialized view of institutional control (Clegg, 1990).
Bureaucracies can also fail where there is great ambiguity and when tasks cease to
be treatable as routines and become unique or exclusive. The ‘clan’, along the lines of
Durkheim’s (1933) conception of ‘organic solidarity’, proposed has been proposed by Ouchi
(1980, p. 135) as a form of relationship appropriate for high performance ambiguity and
low opportunism. The clan assumes interdependence between individuals in a relationship
characterized by social mechanisms. Figure 2 presents a comparison of three different
mechanisms for co-ordinating economic activity—markets, bureaucracy and clans. While
reciprocity is present in all three mechanisms for co-ordinating economic activity only the
clan has common values and beliefs shared by all participants; it is through this mechanism
that collaboration can be achieved, according to Ouchi. While clans achieve collaboration
internally, they are not externally focused—for concepts appropriate to such a focus we
must turn elsewhere.
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Figure 2. Ouchi’s organizational failures framework.
Granovetter’s (1985) critique of TCE—known as the critique from ‘embeddedness’—has
been particularly influential in extending the arguments concerning collaboration from an
internal focus on clans to one more externally oriented to networks. He argues “that the
behaviour and institutions to be analysed are so constrained by ongoing social relations
that to construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding” (Granovetter, 1985,
pp. 481–482). Accordingly, embeddedness points out the importance of personal relations,
‘networks’, in generating trust, compared to the institutionalized arrangement of contracts.
Additionally, networks allow people to establish better communication and information
based on previous experiences with the person one is dealing with. Granovetter argues that,
typically, one transacts with people that one knows: all transactions, including those in
business, are established within a social environment. Such an environment is influenced
by connections not only between participants but also within participant organizations in
such environment. Normally, we term these networks.
Networks
Various forms of network organization (Alter and Hage, 1993; Ebers, 1997; Ebers and
Grandori, 1997; Ebers and Jarillo, 1997; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Jarillo, 1988; Miles and
Snow, 1986; Snow, Miles and Coleman, 1992; Powell, 1987, 1991; Thorelli, 1986) should
be differentiated from strategic alliances (Harrigan, 1987) and joint ventures (Harrigan,
1988). They are a unique form of collaboration, relatively recent as phenomena of explicit
design, but well established in the literature. During the 60s and 70s, sociologists used
networks to understand norms, exchanges and power. Since the 80s, the ‘network’ concept
has become more fashionable in the social sciences applied to business (DeBresson and
Amesse, 1991; Jarillo and Ricart, 1987; Jarillo, 1988; Nohria, 1992).
Networks have been seen as a superior form of organization for firms under those con-
ditions of uncertainty where TCE predicts market failure (Jarillo, 1988; Limerick and
Cunnington, 1993). Networks have been identified in systems and marketing (Ha˚kansson,
1989, 1992; Forsgren et al., 1995); collaboration of small-scale enterprises and or en-
trepreneurship (Johannisson, 1987; Larson, 1992); industrial geography (Grabher, 1995;
Piore and Sabel, 1984; Putnam, 1993), and supplier-user relationships (Burnes and New,
1997; DeBresson and Amesse, 1991; Provan, 1993; Provan and Gassenheimer, 1994). While
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some writers look at substantive aspects of networks (such as Ebers, 1997; Ebers and
Grandori, 1997; Grandori and Soda, 1995), other researchers consider different theoretical
approaches (such as Blankenburg and Johanson, 1992). Some network literature starts at
the enterprise level and considers networks basically as economic relationships (Buttery,
1993; Ha˚kansson, 1989; Johansson and Mattson, 1988, 1991). In contrast, other literature
has used the network concept to address social relations among individuals (Granovetter,
1985).
Castells (1996) regards networks as a new form of paradigm: the old ‘one best way’ of
production is being substituted by a new paradigm based on networks. He considers that
“networks are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made”
(Castells, 1996, p. 168). He notes that in an era of new information technologies, a new or-
ganizational form has emerged, the ‘network enterprise’. Accordingly, a network enterprise
is “that specific form of enterprise whose system of means is constituted by the intersection
of segments of autonomous systems of goals” (Castells, 1996, p. 171).
For the purpose of this paper, a network will be defined as a long-term relationship
between organizations as actors that share resources to achieve negotiated actions for joint
objectives. It should be a long-term relationship because, in the short-term, members can
take advantage of other members such that the relationship will not endure. It is in the
long-term that all members can benefit from the relationship, while in the short-term not
all participants in the network may benefit. Shared resources are vital for establishing long-
term relationships. A network can be established only when based on mutual sharing of
resources. A network should thus have common goals for its members in order to achieve
negotiated outcomes.
Summing up the argument thus far one can say that, in the past, the literature tended to
look at the phenomena of trust as something more or less embedded, naturally, in specific
social contexts and largely absent from expectations surrounding market transactions. TCE
researchers tended to regard it as an aberrant business condition (despite Smith’s (1910)
cautions to the contrary). More recently, however, with the emergence of the importance of
network concepts, both researchers and policy makers have become aware of the positive
economic benefits that might flow from collaborative, trust-based relations being grafted
on to the paradigm of competition. Such grafting is, of course, rather more mechanical than
organic: hence it involves some directing agency. In Australia, it was the Commonwealth
government that acted in this role, when it established the Australian Business Networks
Program.
Australian business networks program
The use of networks as public policy instrument of the Australian Commonwealth govern-
ment has to be seen in the context of the very favourable reception that Porter’s (1990) work
on the competitiveness of nations had in elite policy circles in Canberra. The Australian
federal government launched the Business Networks Program (BNP) in May 1995 as an
initiative of AusIndustry, with a budget of AU$ 25 million. “The aim of the program is to
encourage businesses to cooperate in areas of strategic business, including exporting, im-
port substitution, sharing costs for production, research and development, and marketing”
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(Department of Industry, Science and Technology, 1995, p. 1). The Australian Business Net-
works Program made use of brokers to promote network formation. It was a requirement
for admission as a network in the program to have a network broker for the two first stages
of the program. Two types of brokers were used: host brokers, employed by organizations
such as industry associations, and private consultants. Both groups had to undertake a short
training program to become accredited as AusIndustry brokers.
To be eligible for the program, the basic requirements were that there should be at least
three participants, two of which should be a small or medium size enterprise, while the third
one could be a non-SME. For the purpose of this program, a small or medium size enterprise
was a business with an annual turnover of less than $100 m, or less than 500 employees.
Collaboration in the network had to have the intent to produce internationally traded goods
or services. Participants had to agree to provide information about their individual business
to the BNP and members of the network had to commit senior staff to the Network Project.
Network organizations must improve collaboration in a strategic area of their business
activity such as procurement, production, product or process development, distribution,
domestic and/or export marketing, as well as after sales service. Members should not be
currently linked in any way and should not be receiving financial support for networking
from another Commonwealth or State agency.
In June 1997 major changes to the Business Network Program came into effect. The
conception of a small and medium-sized enterprise was modified to include businesses with
an annual turnover of less that $50 m and with less than 200 employees (Douglas, 1997,
p. 16). Networks could include foreign domiciled firms as members; with the stipulation that
the intended network activity was not a common practice in the sector, nor part of day-to-
day-existing practice, with the requirement remaining that the network produce something
of economic significance to be supported. ‘Vertical networks’, groupings along a segment
of the supply chain, were not eligible for support during stage three (Douglas, 1997, p. 16).
An empirical study
Aims and data collection
A study was carried out in which questionnaire data was collected from employees of
organizations that were members of networks formed as a result of the Australian Business
Networks Program. Assuming that some networks were more effective than others, the aim
of the study was to examine the elements effecting network effectiveness. In this paper we
report on trust as it correlated with items measuring these constructs. The study aimed to
measure the perceived level of trust between network members as well as other properties of
the networks that the literature suggested were related to the level of trust between network
members. Four hypotheses were used for the study:
Hypothesis 1. The greater the levels of trust in a network, the greater the level of
collaboration among participants.
Hypothesis 2. The greater the trust, the greater the dependency on network partners.
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Hypothesis 3. The greater the levels of communication, the greater the trust among
network members.
Hypothesis 4. The less conflict, the greater the trust.
Issues analysed include the extent of sharing of information between network members, the
extent of conflict within the network, and the readiness with which members contact other
members for solutions to problems, to mention a few. The strength of the relations between
the level of trust and these network characteristics will be examined.
Generating the sample for the study took a number of steps. The first was a meeting
with the State Manager of the Business Networks Program in NSW, who was able to
identify those business networks that were in a more advanced stage of development, and
were therefore more suitable for the study. The second step was to make contact with the
networks in NSW. It was a difficult task because not all networks were publicly listed as
such, and the Business Networks Program, for policy reasons of protecting commercial
confidence, would not release the full data set. Thirdly, was to try to access all the Business
Networks in Australia that could be contacted. The list of close to 190 networks existing
in Australia in December 1996 was obtained. This was a list of network names, not the
network member organizations. Many of these were in the very initial stages of formation.
With the use of the telephone directory, the contact numbers for 29 different networks were
obtained. It was not possible to obtain the telephone number for all the networks because
so many of them were at the initial steps of their formation and thus not registered in the
telephone book. However, this was not a serious problem, as these would not have been
useful for this research.
Those business networks whose telephone numbers we obtained were contacted to seek
their support for the research. All of them agreed, in principle, to cooperate in the re-
search. Support from the AusIndustry Business Network program to ensure participation
was sought, but their policy at that time was not to support specific research. It is also
important to note that the change from a federal Labor to a Coalition government caused
some changes in public policy. The network program was seen as a more ‘interventionist’
type of industry policy than one that would be favoured by the Coalition. From the response
obtained in these telephone calls, 100 questionnaires were sent to 29 different business net-
works all over Australia. A total of 33 were returned from a variety of different industries
and sectors.
The questionnaire
The process to determine the appropriate questionnaire items began with an extensive
literature search and review. This review was used to identify the characteristics of network
collaboration and its forms. Based on the assessment of several frameworks, an initial set of
questions to be asked was obtained. Before embarking on the constructing of a questionnaire,
two pilot in-depth interviews with network members in New South Wales were conducted.
These were used to develop an appropriate interview technique for open-ended, face-to-face
interviews and direct field observations. In-depth interviews were open-ended, lasted one
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to two hours, and were carried out over a one-year period. The interviews were conducted
with actors involved in the promotion, development and management of different forms of
collaboration. The interviews generated feedback on the relevance of the range of questions
proposed for inclusion in the questionnaire and ensured that respondents easily understood
the questions. After a prototype questionnaire was developed, some items were changed
from having an open-ended to a closed-ended response format. This final questionnaire
contained 200 items, obtaining both qualitative and quantitative data.
For the purpose of the present paper, 16 questionnaire items were selected for analysis.
These items are listed in Table 2. The first item obtains information of the extent to which
respondents trust other network members. The remaining 15 items relate to aspects of
networks that have been suggested in the literature as being related to the level of trust
between network members. Most of these are self evident, with the exception, perhaps, of
item 13, which emerges from the literature on strategic contingencies and power (Hickson
et al., 1971). The presumption here is that if there is one such member, then, the network
members will be overly reliant on them—and thus may either feel that they have to trust
them or that because the fate of the network lies in their hands that they cannot trust them
at all.
Results
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the items used in this study. For
items 1 to 10, responses were given on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The mean score for the first item, “I always trust other
network members”, equal to 3.74, is thus just above the scale midpoint of 3, indicating
a general, though not strong, agreement with this statement. Similar, generally positive,
responses to items 2 to 9 can also be seen, with mean scores being consistently above the
scale midpoints and ranging from 3.10 for item 7 to 3.88 for item 5. For items 10 and 11,
higher scores indicate a greater tendency for members to take advantage of other members
and for a greater level of conflict in the network. Therefore, the relatively low mean scores
for these two items (1.96 and 1.97, respectively) show a perceived general absence of these
less desirable characteristics.
For items 12 to 15, with response options “Yes” and “No”, the mean scores shown in
Table 2 can be interpreted as the proportion of subjects who responded “Yes”. Thus, the
percentage of subjects that responded “Yes” to items 12 to 15 were 66%, 36%, 16% and
10%, respectively. Thus, a majority of respondents (66%) agreed that competitors should
be admitted as members, while only a minority of respondents agreed that any particular
member is critical to the network (36%), that it is difficult to raise for discussion some
issues (16%) and that there were issues raised that the respondent would have preferred
not to discuss (10%). For item 16, the mean score was 1.16, indicating that a tendency for
responses to be towards the “Increased” end of the three-point scale. Of the 31 subjects that
responded to this item, 26 responded that the level of collaboration had increased, 5 that it
had remained stable, with none indicating that it had decreased.
Table 2 also shows the correlations between responses to the first item, that measures
the degree of trust between network members, and responses to the remaining 15 items.
358 PORRAS, CLEGG AND CRAWFORD
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for all variables and correlations with levels of trust.
Standard Correlations with
Questionnaire items Means deviations trust (Item 1)
1. I always trust other network members. 3.74 .98
2. I am always confident that other network 3.56 .96 .65∗∗
members will consider my point of view when
making decisions in my absence.
3. I am always confident that other network 3.72 .94 .53∗∗
members will not take any decisions
that will adversely affect my organization.
4. In the network, members never behave 3.27 1.08 .65∗∗
opportunistically.
5. The network should discuss the existence 3.88 1.19 .03
of competition between members.
6. The broker can initiate actions on behalf 3.13 1.18 −.01
of the network.
7. Any member can initiate actions on behalf 3.10 1.18 .31
of the network.
8. When I have a business problem, I frequently 3.61 1.28 .35
contact other network members for
possible solutions.
9. My organization always shares information 3.81 1.02 .37
with other network members.
10. In the network, members often take advantage 1.96 .84 −.47∗
of other members.
11. How would you gauge the level of conflict in 1.97 .82 −.48∗
your network?
12. Do you think that the network should admit .66 .48 −.38
competitors as members?
13. Is there any network member whose participation .36 .49 .00
is critical for the survival of the network?
14. Are there some issues that you would like .16 .37 −.54∗∗
to discuss at a meeting but find difficult to raise?
15. Are there any issues raised by other members .10 .30 .23
that you would have preferred not to discuss?
16. Over the life of the network, has collaboration 1.16 .37 −.13
increased, remained stable, or decreased?
Notes: ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01.
For items 1 to 10, response scales were from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
For item 11, response scale was from 1 (low conflict) to 5 (high conflict).
For items 12 to 15, response options were 1 (yes) and 0 (no).
For item 16, response options were 1 (increased), 2 (stable) and 3 (decreased).
Correlation shown are Spearman’s rhos.
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Relatively high and statistically significant positive correlations can be seen between the
first item and items 2, 3 and 4. Thus the level of trust between network members was strongly
correlated with the belief that other members will consider the respondent’s point of view
when making decisions (item 2; r = .65, p < .01), with the level of confidence that other
members will not make decisions that will adversely affect the respondent’s organization
(item 3; r = .53, p < .01), and with the perception that network members never behave
opportunistically (item 4; r = .65, p < .01). In addition, statistically significant negative
correlations with the first item were obtained for items 10, 11 and 14. Thus, the level
of trust between members was negatively associated with the belief that members often
take advantage of each other (item 10; r = −.47, p < .05), with the perceived level of
conflict in the organization (item 11; r = −.48, p < .05) and with respondents finding it
difficult to raise issues for discussion (item 14; r = −.54, p < .01). We can also note the
existence of a number of correlations with the first item that are above 0.3 in magnitude,
but are not statistically significant (r ’s of .31, .35, .37 and −.38, for items 7, 8, 9 and 12
respectively).
Discussion
According to network members’ perceptions, being involved in network relationships leads
to greater levels of collaboration between the participants. While the majority of members
in networks approved the inclusion of competitors as network members, a small number did
not accept the idea. Being part of a network does not mean absolute trust; there are issues
that organizations keep close, such as finances, copyrights and those elements considered
as a core competence for the organization.
To increase the level of trust between network members, several actions are necessary. For
example, it is necessary to consider the others point of view when making decisions for the
network. All member organizations, in particular small-size participants, need to perceive
that their opinion is important for all other members; good handling of this issue will make
the relationship stronger. Members become worried about the position of the network when
they are absent from the meetings for decision-making. A crucial network task is to make
members feel secure that their point of view will be considered when decision-making
takes place in the network, even if they are not present. It is also important to make clear
for members that decisions taken in the network will never have a negative effect on their
particular organization. Members regard with suspicion any action that might jeopardize
their organization. Previous opportunistic behaviours by members have a negative impact
on the life of the network. Thus, if there were cases in the past when members behaved
opportunistically, the members have to make it very clear that the case was an exception,
and that the normal condition is to share matters and raise any issue affecting the member
and/or the network.
The level of conflict within a network may have a negative effect on trust among members;
similarly high trust can either increase conflict—because members feel able to be more
open—or reduce it because they are much more prepared to gloss the actions of other
members positively. While certain levels of conflict are good in any relationship, if the level
of conflict is not managed, members will tend to mistrust other participants in the network.
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Thus hypothetically, the higher the level of conflict, the lower the trust. Another important
element restricting trust is the difficulty some members have in raising issues for discussion.
If members are aware that some questions cannot be discussed with a network member,
they will restrain their participation and trust in the network. A sure sign of trust was that
members believed that they could share their organizational problems with other network
members. When members considered that they could trust other network members, they
were still largely convinced that network members should not act alone as if they were doing
so on behalf of the network: there always needs to be consultation. There was a perception
that this kind of action would lead to opportunistic behaviour, which would be detrimental
for the relationship. We can also note that while network members recognised the existence
of moderate levels of conflict within the network, this did not mean that trust was lacking.
Thus, it would be a mistake necessarily to associate harmony with trust or to see it as a
precondition.
Implications
Several lessons may be derived from experiences gained in the formation and implementa-
tion of networks programs. From the point of view of an interest in trust, we appreciate that
networks have increased the level of collaboration among organizations participating in the
relationship. Participants considered that networks should admit competitors to the network
as members and, to the extent that they did, they were able to build the basis for trustworthy
collaboration within the collaborative/competitive framework. They did so largely through
careful delimitation of the areas in which they competed and the areas in which they col-
laborated. It is always important that network members trust other participants; however
trust is not blind, particularly when there are competitors in the network. Trust emerges in
the long-term; networks are created for mutual benefit for all members, and it is only in the
long run that participants may obtain a benefit; in the meantime it is in the daily interaction
between network members that trust flourishes.
Conclusions
The research reported here suggests that applying the network concept in business is a sound
way of building on, and amplifying, existing trust relations and indicates the centrality
of these for success in the contemporary business world. Just as micro-economic reform
processes have been oriented towards the economic basis of relations between different
economic actors then the networks program may be thought of as an attempt to intervene
in the social basis of these relations: building trust. These do not have to be left to the
market and can be facilitated: the social basis of market relations is as evident as it is
important and needs to take a more central role in public policy and in those disciplines—
such as economics and management—that inform it. However, as our research attests, if
the hard technologies are available, then those organizations that can embed their networks
in relations built on trust will make the best use of them.
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